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JUDICIAL BACKGROUNDS AND CRIMINAL CASES
STUART S. NAGEL*
Various scholars of the judicial process have com-
piled data on differences in the backgrounds of
American judges, but they have not shown that
these background characteristics correlate with
differences in the decisions of the judges analyzed.'
Various other scholars of the judicial process have
compiled data on the different decisional tenden-
cies of American judges, but they similarly have
not shown that these decisional propensities corre-
late with differences in the backgrounds of the
judiciary.2 It is the purpose of this paper to explore
the empirical relationships between various back-
ground and attitudinal characteristics of judges
and their decisions in criminal cases.3
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
4
The judges analyzed consist of the 313 state
and federal supreme court judges listed in the 1955
* Professor Nagel, a member of the Illinois bar, is
Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Sci-
ence of the University of Illinois.
The writer gratefully thanks the Political Theory
and Legal Philosophy Committee of the Social Science
Research Council for providing funds for conducting a
study of relations between judicial characteristics andjudicial decision-making of which study this paper is a
part. Thanks are also owed to the members of the 1960
SSRC Summer Research Institute on the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice for the suggestions which they
made relevant to the completion of this paper.1 E.g., Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme
Court: A Collective Portrait, 3 M.W.J. or PoL SCL 1
(1958); EwING, THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT
1789-1937 (1938); Mott, Judicial Personnel, 167 AN-
NALS 143 (1933).
2E.g., Gaudet, Individual Differences in Sentencing
Tendencies of Judges, 32 ARcmiEs oF PSYcHOLOGY 1
(1938); Iverson, Human Element in Justice, 10 J.
Cm. L. & C. 90 (1919); PITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT
COURT (1948); SCnUERr, QUANTITATIvE ANALYsIs Or
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959).
Non-statistical speculations on the relations be-
tween judicial characteristics and judicial decisions
include Haines, General Observations on the Effects of
Personal, Political, and Economic Influences on the
Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 96 (1922); FRANx,
COURTS ON TRIAL 146-56, 165-85 (1950); CARR, THE
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 231-57 (1942);
and Hall, Determination of Methods for Ascertaining the
Factors that Influence Judicial Decisions in Cases In-
volving Due Process of Law, 20 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 127
(1926).
4 For a more detailed analysis and justification of the
judges, the cases, and the analysis used in the research
design than can be given here see Nagel, Testing Rela-
tions Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial
Decision-Making (a mimeographed paper presented at
the 1961 Midwest Conference of Political Scientists).
Copies of this paper are available on request from the
writer.
Directory of American Judges;5 15 judges so listed
left the bench before the end of the year, however,
and as a result were included in only certain por-
tions of the study.8 The background characteris-
tics of the judges were determined by consulting
the Directory of American Judges, Who's Who in
America,7 the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory,8
and the governmental directories published by
many of the states. The attitudinal characteristics
of the judges were determined on the basis of their
answers to mailed questionnaires.
The cases analyzed consist of the full-court
criminal cases which these judges heard in 1955.
By full-court cases is meant cases heard by all
judges in the sample from the court involved. By
criminal cases is meant cases in which one party
was charged with an act subject to fine, imprison-
ment, or other penalty owed to the collectivity
rather than to the individuals who may have been
particularly harmed. The cases involved both ap-
peals and habeas corpus proceedings, and they
centered around questions of guilt, punishment, or
procedure. Tax and business regulation cases were
excluded because they were analyzed separately
in the larger study of which this paper is a part.
Each judge was given a decision score represent-
ing the proportion of times he voted for the defense
out of all the times he voted in the criminal cases.
For example, in the 21 Pennsylvania criminal
cases,
9 Justice Arnold voted 3 times for the de-
'DIRECTORY or AMERICAN JUDGES (Liebman ed.
1955). This source is sometimes referred to herein as the
DIRECTORY.
6 The term "supreme court" is used as a synonym
for "highest court" or "court of last resort." Statements
in this paper describing the background characteristics
of the judges are based on all 313 judges, except for
those who did not supply the relevant background in-
formation. Statements describing the relations between
backgrounds and decisional tendencies, however, are
based on 298 judges (313 minus the 15 judges who left
the bench before the end of the year), except for those
who did not supply the relevant background informa-
tion, who sat only on unanimous cases, or who sat on
courts that were homogeneous as to the relevant back-
ground characteristics.
726, 27, 28 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA (Sammons ed.
1954, 1956, 1958).
8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INC., MARTINDALE-HUB-
BELL LAW DIRECTORY (1955).
0 Commonwealth v. Burdell, 380 Pa. 43, 110 A.2d
193 (1955); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52,
110 A.2d 216 (1955); Commonwealth v. Mackley, 380
Pa. 70, 110 A.2d 172 (1955); Commonwealth v. Grays,
380 Pa. 77, 110 A.2d 422 (1955); Commonwealth ex.
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fense, resulting in a decision score of .14. Sometimes
a judge did not vote clearly for either the prosecu-
tion or the defense, as where he concurred in part
and dissented in part. In one Pennsylvania case, 0
Justice Musmanno cast such a half-way vote, re-
sulting in a decision score of 11 Y out of 21 or .55.
The data were analyzed to determine what judi-
cial characteristics, if any, were associated with a
decision score above the average for a given court.
For example, the question was posed whether being
a Democrat rather than a Republican is associated
with a decision score above the average for one's
court. The answers to this and similar questions
for the data used are presented in the Table
which accompanies this paper.
The Table includes data for only those courts
on which both groups compared are present, be-
cause if, for example, there are all Democrats or all
Republicans on a court, then comparisons within
the court between judges from the two parties can-
not be made. The Table also includes data for only
non-unanimous cases, because the unanimous
cases have no bearing on who is above or below the
average decision score of a court.
The probability scores listed in the far right
column represent the probability of the observed
differences occurring merely by chance, given the
number of judges involved in each group." Where
the scores are less than .05 (i.e., less than 5 out of
100), the differences have been regarded as statis-
tically significant and not merely attributable to
chance, in accordance with conventional statis-
tical procedures. In the discussion which follows,
each row will be discussed separately, and an illus-
rel. Dunn v. Ruch, 380 Pa. 152, 110 A.2d 240 (1955);
Commonwealth ex. rel. Lane v. Baldi, 380 Pa. 201, 110
A.2d 409 (1955); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa.
532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955); Commonwealth v. LaRue,
381 Pa. 113, 112 A.2d 362 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Lane, 381 Pa. 293, 113 A.2d 290 (1955); Common-
wealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A.2d 274 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Mason, 381 Pa. 309, 112 A.2d 174
(1955); Commonwealth v. Cisneros 381 Pa. 447, 113
A.2d 293 (1955); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa.
500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth ex rd. Mat-
thews v. Day, 381 Pa. 617, 114 A.2d 122 (1955); Com-
monwealth v. Farrow. 382 Pa. 61, 114 A.2d 170 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72, 114 A.2d 338
(1955); Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 114 A.2d
334 (1955); Commonwealth ex rt. Taylor v. Superin-
tendent of the County Prison, 382 Pa. 181, 114 A.2d
343 (1955); Commonwealth ex rt. Bishop v. Maroney,
382 Pa. 324, 114 A.2d 906 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955); Common-
wealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 117 A.2d 96 (1955).
10 Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A.2d
216 (1955).
" YUKxR, A GUIDE TO STATISTICAL CALCULATIONS
64-66 (1958); SIEGEL, NoN-PARAMeTRIC STATISTICS
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 13-14 (1956).
trative court will be described for each relationship




The first row of the Table tends to indicate that
on the bipartisan supreme courts Democratic and
Republican judges do differ from one another in
deciding criminal cases. In 1955, 15 bipartisan state
and federal supreme courts decided at least one
non-unanimous criminal case on which all their
judges sat. These courts were comprised of 85
judges who gave a party affiliation in the sources
consulted. Fifty-five per cent of the 40 Democrats
were above the average of their respective courts
on the decision score, whereas only 31 per cent
of the 45 Republicans were above the average of
their respective courts on the decision score.
The California Supreme Court illustrates this
statistically significafit difference. Two of the Cali-
fornia judges, Justices Carter and Traynor, de-
clared themselves as Democrats in the Directory,
and 2, Justices Shenk and Spence, declared them-
selves as Republicans. Justices Edmonds, Gibson,
and Schauer did not indicate party affiliation. It is
unusual for so many judges on a supreme court not
to give party affiliation. The California Supreme
Court, however, is not an elected court. Partly to
eliminate partisan influence, the judges are ap-
pointed initially by the governor with the approval
of a Commission on Qualifications, and they appear
on the ballot for voter approval every 12 years
thereafter. In 1955 only Missouri had a similar
system of judicial election. In spite of this attempt
to eliminate partisan divisions, Democrats Carter
and Traynor were on opposite sides of Republicans
Shenk and Spence in a large number of cases of
different types. All 7 judges of the court heard 14
criminal cases together in which non-unanimous
decisions were reached."2 The 2 Democrats had an
12 Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 755, 278 P.2d
681 (1955); In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24
(1955); People v. Sykes, 44 Cal. 2d 166, 280 P.2d 769
(1955); Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 178,
281 P.2d 250 (1955); In re Bartges, 44 Cal. 2d 241, 282
P.2d 47 (1955); People v. Cavanaugh, 44 Cal. 2d 252,
282 P.2d 53 (1955); People v. Terry, 44 Cal. 2d 371,
282 P.2d 19 (1955); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
282 P.2d 905 (1955); People v. Berger, 44 Cal. 2d 459,
282 P.2d 509 (1955); People v. Jackson, 44 Cal. 2d
511, 282 P.2d 898 (1955); In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171,
288 P.2d 5 (1955); People v. Acosta, 45 Cal. 2d 538,
290 P.2d 1 (1955); People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d
590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955); Calhoun v. Superior Court,
46 Cal. 2d 18, 291 P.2d 474 (1955).
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TABLE
How JUDGES OF DIFFERING BACKGROUNDS AND ATTITUDES DIFFER IN TiHEIR CRIMINAL CASE DEcisIONs
Based on the non-unanimous cases of the state and federal supreme courts of 1955 on which both groups being
compared are present.
I 'of - ofNumber of Group I Group 2Judges In- Above Above
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+9 1 .05 to .20
+30 1 Less than .05
Less than .05
average decision score in these cases of 85 per cent
for the defense, whereas the 2 Republicans had an
average decision score in the same cases of only 18
per cent for the defense. In the famous Chessman
case of 1955, for example, the only 2 dissenters in
favor of the defense were Democrats Carter and
Traynor.
Other supreme courts in which the Democrats
had a higher average decision score for the defense
than did the Republicans include the supreme
courts of Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan,
Montana, New Jersey, Rhode Island, North
Dakota, and Pennsylvania. Of the 15 courts with
qualifying criminal cases, only the Illinois, New
York, Ohio, Utah, and federal supreme courts
followed an opposite pattern, although not to as
.33519621
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great extent as the 10 courts which followed the
general pattern.
Pressure Group Affiliations
Many of the judges were members of pressure
groups which endorse various kinds of legislation.
The types of pressure groups most frequently men-
tioned were professional groups (e.g, the American
Bar Association), veterans' groups (e.g., the
American Legion), business groups (e.g., chambers
of commerce), and nativist groups (e.g., the Sons
of the American Revolution). Decision scores of
the judges who were members of these groups did
not differ to a statistically significant extent from
the decision scores of the non-member judges, with
the exception of the scores pertaining to member-
ship in the American Bar Association. The Table
shows that 52 per cent of the judges who indicated
(in the Directory, Who's Who, or Martindale-Hub-
bell) that they were not members of the A.B.A. had
decision scores above the average for their respec-
tive courts, whereas only 37 per cent of the judges
who indicated that they were members of the
ABA had such scores.
On the United States Supreme Court, for in-
stance, Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and
Minton did not indicate ABA membership, while
Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Burton,
Clark, Harlan, and Reed, did indicate such mem-
bership. In the 9 full-court non-unanimous crimi-
nal cases of 1955, the 4 non-ABA members had
an average decision score of 70 per cent for the de-
fense, whereas the 5 ABA members had only an
average decision source of 51 per cent. 3 Subsequent
to 1955 the Chief Justice withdrew from the ABA
on ideological grounds. If Warren were considered
a non-ABA member in 1955, then the average
decision score of the non-ABA group would move
up to 71 per cent for the defense, and the average
decision score of the ABA group would move
down to 45 per cent for the defense.
Pre-Judicial Occupations
Many of the judges indicated that they had
formerly held occupations other than the private
practice of law. The types of occupations most fre-
quently mentioned were prosecuting attorney,
"3 Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); In the
Matter of Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Bart v. United States, 349
U.S. 219 (1955); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375(1955); Donaducy v. Pennsylvania, 349 U.S. 913(1955); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11 (1955); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
legislator, corporation counsel, businessman,
teacher, public administrator, attorney general,
and regulatory agency attorney. The pre-judicial
occupations thought to have the most relevance to
decisional differences among judges in criminal
cases were those of businessman and prosecuting
attorney. Although judges who were former busi-
nessmen tended to have a lower decision score for
the defense in criminal cases than did judges who
were not, the difference was not quite statistically
significant. However, 50 per cent of the judges
who did not indicate being former prosecutors had
decision scores above the average for their respec-
tive courts, whereas only 36 per cent of the judges
who did indicate being former prosecutors had
such scores.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court exemplifies
the general pattern found on supreme courts having
some judges who were former prosecutors. On this
court, 3 of the judges (Justices Arnold, Bell, and
Chidsey) indicated tLey had been prosecutors be-
fore becoming judges. In the 9 nonunanimous
criminal cases which the full court heard in 1955,
the other 4 judges in the court (Justices Jones,
Musmanno, Stearne, and Stern) had an average
decision score of 26 per cent for the defense,
whereas the 3 judges who were former prosecutors
had an average decision score for the defense of only
7 per cent 4 Mr. Justice Musmanno, the famous
defense lawyer in the Sacco-Vanzetti case and
other criminal cases, alone had a decision score of
94 per cent for the defense in these cases.
Education, Age, and Geography
Approximately one-third of the 313 supreme
court judges serving in 1955 went to law schools
whose annual tuition was under $120 in 1927 (the
earliest year for which school-by-school tuition
figures are available), and approximately one-
third went to law schools whose annual tuition
was over $240.1' A higher percentage of judges who
1 Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A.2d
216 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Dunn v. Ruch, 380
Pa. 152, 110 A.2d 240 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel.
Lane v. Baldi, 380 Pa. 201, 110 A.2d 409 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379(1955); Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113, 112
A.2d 362 (1955); Commonwealth v. Mason, 381 Pa.
309, 112 A.2d 174 (1955); Commonwealth v. Cisneros,
381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d 293 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel.
Taylor v. Superintendent of the County Prison, 382
Pa. 181, 114 A.2d 343 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
1" Tuition figures for the last law school each judge
attended were taken from REED, REviEw OF LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR
THlE YEAR 1928 (1929).
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went to low tuition law schools (under $120) had
decision scores above the average for their respec-
tive courts than did judges who went to high tui-
tion law schools (over $240). This difference, how-
ever, was not statistically significant. Likewise
there was no statistically significant difference be-
tween judges in the bottom third age group (under
60) and judges in the top third age group (over 65).
There was also no statistically significant differ-
ence between judges who practiced law initially in
small towns with populations under 5,000 (the
bottom third among the judges) and judges who
practiced initially in large cities with populations
over 100,000 (the top third among the judges). 6
Because in this study comparisons are made only
within courts, comparisons are not made between
judges of different regions. If &outhern supreme
courts were compared with northern supreme
courts, however, one might hypothesize that the
southern courts would have a higher per cent of
judgments granted to the defense than would the
northern courts because (1) violence is possibly
more condoned in the south than in the north, ex-
cept violence by a Negro against a white, (2) less
efficient southern police are possibly more likely
to bring innocent persons to trial than are northern
police, and (3) southern lower courts are possibly
more likely to commit reversible error than are
northern lower courts.
Religion and Ancestral Nationality
Most of the judges with entries in the Directory
of American Judges listed their religion in response
to the Directory questionnaire. There were too few
Jewish supreme court judges to make comparisons
between Jewish and non-Jewish judges. There were
11 supreme courts, however, which had some Cath-
olic and some Protestant judges, and which heard
some non-unanimous criminal cases with all judges
present. These 11 supreme courts had 57 judges
who indicated they were either Catholics or Protes-
tants. 56 per cent of the 18 Catholic judges had
decision scores above the average for their respec-
tive courts, whereas only 31 per cent of the 39
Protestants had such scores.
This statistically significant difference is illus-
trated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Justices
Brennan and Heher indicated they were Catholics;
1c Population figures for the place of initial law prac-
tice of each judge were taken from 1 U.S. BmEAu
oF THE CENsUs, DFP'T oF CoNeRcE, CENSUS oF
POPULATION 178-320 (1920). The year 1920 was the
census year nearest to the year when the average judge
among the 313 judges began practicing law.
Justices Oliphant, Vanderbilt, and Wachenfeld
indicated they were Protestants; and Justices
Burling and Jacobs gave no religious affiliation. In
the 12 non-unanimous criminal cases which the
full New Jersey Supreme Court heard in 1955, the
2 Catholics had an average decision score for the
defense of 52 per cent, whereas the 3 Protestants
had an average decision score for the defense of
only 28 per cent.17
The members of certain Protestant denomina-
tions are traditionally thought to have a higher
average income than that of members of other
Protestant denominations. The relatively high
income denominations are the Congregationalist,
Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Unitarian; and
the relatively low income denominations are the
Baptist, Lutheran, and Methodist. 8 When judges
from each of the two groups sitting on the same
supreme court criminal cases were compared, the
judges from the relatively low income denomina-
tions tended to have i higher decision score for the
defense than did the judges from the relatively
high income denominations. The difference, how-
ever, was not quite statistically significant.
The ancestral nationality of each judge can be
roughly determined by taking each judge's pa-
ternal and maternal family names or their com-
ponent parts to Elsdon C. Smith's Dictionary of
Family Names (1956), which in dictionary form
gives the nationality origin of over 10,000 family
names. If one compares judges whose ancestral
nationality is exclusively British (which includes
English, Scotch, or Welsh) with judges on the
same court whose ancestral nationality is at least
partly non-British (to the extent determinable in
the Smith book), one finds that the judges of par-
tially non-British derivation tend to have higher
decision scores for the defense than do the judges
of wholly British derivation on the same courts.
This difference, however, is not quite statistically
significant.
17 State v. Schmelz, 17 N.J. 227, 11 A.2d SO (1955);
State v. Newton, 17 N.J. 271, 111 A.2d 272 (1955);
State v. Low, 18 N.J. 179, 113 A.2d 169 (1955); State
v. Cianoi, 18 N.J. 191, 13 A.2d 176 (1955); Johnson v.
State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955); In the Matter of
White, 18 N.J. 449, 114 A.2d 261 (1955); State v.
Haines, 18 N.J. 550, 115 A.2d 24 (1955); State v. Wise,
19 N.J. 59, 115 A.2d 62 (1955); State v. Fary, 19 N.J.
431, 117 A.2d 499 (1955); State v. D'Ippolita, 19 N.J.
540, 117 A.2d 592 (1955); State v. DeMeo, 20 N.J. 1,
118 A.2d 1 (1955); State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118
A.2d 812 (1955).
18 Allinsmith, Religious Affiliation and Politico-Eco-
nomic Attitudes, 12 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 377 (1948).
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Off-the-Bench Attitudes
In the spring of 1960 a mailed questionnaire was
sent to each of the 313 state and federal supreme
court judges of 1955 in order to determine their
attitudes on various issues. One hundred and nine-
teen of the judges returned answered question-
naires. The questiqnnaire represented a condensed
and revised version of a liberalism-conservatism
questionnaire written by H. J. Eysenck.19 The
judges were asked to indicate whether on the
whole they agreed a lot, agreed a little, neither
agreed nor disagreed, disagreed a little, or dis-
agreed a lot with a list of statements. The ques-
tionnaire was primarily designed to measure the
degree of sympathy a respondent has for less
privileged groups and the degree of acceptance he
has toward long run social change. These two com-
ponents make up what is generally referred to as
liberalism.20 The questionnaire was scored in such
a way that a respondent could receive a liberalism
score ranging from 41 to 195. The median liberal-
ism score actually received was 109. Seventeen
supreme courts that heard full-court non-unani-
mous criminal cases had at least one judge with a
score over 109 and at least one judge with a score
at or below 109. Fifty-seven per cent of the judges
scoring above 109 were above the average of the
respondents of their respective courts on the de-
cision score, whereas only 27 per cent of the judges
scoring at or below 109 were above the average of
the respondents of their respective courts on the
decision score. This difference is statistically sig-
nificant, but a specific example cannot be given
because the judges were promised anonymity if
they responded to the questionnaire.
There was one particularly relevant statement
to which the judges were asked to respond by indi-
cating whether and how much they agreed or dis-
agreed. This statement read "Our treatment of
criminals is too harsh; we should try to cure not to
punish them." Twenty-four of the 119 responding
judges indicated they strongly disagreed on the
whole with the statement, 48 disagreed but not
strongly, 22 neither disagreed nor agreed, 20 agreed
on the whole but not strongly, and 5 agreed
strongly. The average responding judge was thus
in between disagreeing mildly and being neutral.
Fifty-nine per cent of those who were neutral or
who agreed with the statement were above the
19 EYsENc, PSYCHOLOGY OF POLrTICS 122-24 (1954).
2 MACIVER, TrE WEB OF GOVERNMENT 215-17
(1951).
average of the respondents of their respective
courts on the decision score, whereas only 27 per
cent of those who disagreed with the statement
were above the average of the respondents of their
respective courts on the decision score. This differ-
ence is statistically significant.
REASONS AND REMEDIES
How might one account for the relationships be-
tween judicial characteristics and judicial decision-
making that have been described? Some of the
relationships found are easily attributable to
chance. Others, however, are not. The latter are
those where the odds are more than 95 to 5, or 19
to 1, of obtaining the differences purely by chance
given the size of the differences and the size of
the groups. They include the differences between
Democratic arid Republican judges, non-ABA
members and ABA members, non-former prose-
cutors and former prosecutors, Catholic :udges
and Protestant judges, and relatively liberal judges
and relatively conservative judges as measured by
their off-the-bench attitudes.
To some extent a criminal case represents a con-
flict of social groups, in that the defendant gener-
ally tends to be a member of the lower-middle or
working class (particularly if tax and business
regulation cases are analyzed separately),21 and
the prosecutor tends to be a member of the upper-
middle or upper class, enforcing laws promulgated
by upper-middle and upper class legislators and
judges.n Mass data show that persons holding
certain positions (e.g., being a Democrat or a
Catholic) with respect to background characteris-
tics (e.g., party or religion) tend to have greater
sympathy for lower economic and social groups
than do persons holding obverse positions.2 Given
the nature of the average criminal case, judges
holding such positions with respect to background
characteristics are therefore likely to have a higher
decision score for the defense than do judges hold-
ing obverse background positions. The correlation
between a judge's position on background char-
acteristics and his relative degree of sympathy for
lower economic and social groups may account for
the differences found concerning party, pressure
groups, religion, and liberal-conservative attitudes.
21 TAFT, CRIMINOLOGY 131-33 (1950).
2 2 MATTHEwS, THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF POLITI-
CAL DECISION-MAKERS 23-30 (1954).
2 CAMPBELL, GURIN & MILLER, TlE VOTER DE-
crEs (1954); TURNER, PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY:
PRESSURES ON CONGRESS (1951).
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However, it probably does not account for the
differences found between former prosecutors and
their opposite number; judges who are former
prosecutors are probably on the average not sub-
stantially more or less ideologically liberal than
judges who have not been prosecutors. Their
lower decision scores for the defense are possibly
more attributable to a relatively pro-prosecution
frame of reference which caused them to become
prosecutors or which they acquired or had rein-
forced when they served as prosecutors.
Many devices are available for minimizing the
influence of judicial backgrounds, including the
availability to defendants of easy appeals, the re-
quirement that judges write opinions to justify
their decisions, the use of multi-judge courts with
judges of diversified backgrounds, and the drafting
of clearer and more detailed substantive statutes
thereby limiting the area of judicial discretion.
Because criminal cases frequently involve value-
oriented controversies, however, and because differ-
ent background and attitudinal positioPs tend to
correspond to different value orientations, there
will probably always be some correlation between
judicial characteristics and judicial decision-mak-
ing in criminal cases.
